The cross-section of average annual returns on German common stock in the period of 1881-1913 exhibits several of the patterns that have been observed in more recent U.S. data. Market beta is hardly important, and its explanatory power is swamped by size and the ratio of book value to market value. A book-to-market risk measure covariance with a portfolio long in high book-to-market rms and short in low book-to-market rms has no e ect on the explanatory power of the book-to-market characteristic. But the size e ect appears to be caused by selection bias in the sample. And the book-to-market e ect is opposite that of the recent U.S. experience and, hence, can certainly not be attributed to selection bias. Finally, a momentum portfolio constructed on the basis of the error of the basic 3-characteristic model market beta, size and book-to-market does not generate signi cant returns. These ndings highlight the variability in the power of certain characteristics in explaining the cross section of average returns.
book-to-market ratio explains part of the error left by the 3-factor model. Moreover, an additional characteristic, momentum, has explanatory power beyond the 3-factor model Fama and French, 1996 . Most of the ndings have been corroberated on the basis of evidence from foreign non-U.S. stock markets Fama and French, 1998 .
The goal of this paper is to investigate the stability of the relationship between average excess returns and the three traditional characteristics beta, size, and book-tomarket ratio, the HLM covariance book-to-market factor, and momentum. Evidence has emerged that the relationship is far from constant Davis, Fama and French, 2000 , and, more speci cally, that it varies quite substantially across stock markets in the world Hawawini and Keim, 1998 . Con rmation of this instability would be disturbing, because it would dampen expectations that the alleged patterns across stock returns have useful predictive content. That is, ndings for recent American markets may beunable to predict patterns in new, hitherto unexplored markets, or even forecast future patterns in a w ell-studied market.
The paper studies stock returns in Germany from . The choice of this market is important for two reasons. First, the time period does not overlap with that in studies which discovered the size and book-to-market e ect in the U.S. at most going back to 1929. There is a major methodological advantage of choosing a di erent time period: there are hardly any informational linkages between the German period under study and the U.S. period commonly analyzed. It could plausibly be argued that size and book-to-market e ects have recently been present across di erent stock markets in the world because they all shared similar information ows the cold war, increasing importance of international trade in goods and services, common technological breakthroughs, etc.. The informational background against which the German markets operated in the period 1881-1913 was vastly di erent. If one discovers size and book-tomarket e ects there as well, it cannot beclaimed anymore that these factors are caused by common information ows.
The choice of location, Germany, is also of importance and raises the second motivation for our selection. While Germany had a di erent nancial intermediation system universal, relationship banking system, stock markets also played an important role in nancing investment contrary to widespread belief. During the period 1881-1913, the Berlin stock exchange Berliner B orse, for instance, listed a large and growing number of companies; about one half the numberof listed companies on the NYSE as of 1950, for an economy whose size was only a fraction of that of the U.S. of the fties. Thus, the German case is an important historical case of a nancial system that combined strong banks with active securities markets. This paper addresses the following speci c questions. Is there evidence of size or book-to-market e ects in the cross-section of average returns on common stock listed on the Berlin exchange in the period ? If so, is the nature of the e ect the same as in the recent U.S. history smaller rms outperform larger ones; high book-to-market rms outperform low book-to-market rms? Are they proxies for risk? Is there any momentum e ect left after taking into account these e ects?
The paper reports results based on the rst dataset that has been collected on company-speci c historical data for Germany o ver . It includes annual returns on fty companies. There is a strong selection bias in this dataset, because companies were selected on the basis of continuous listing during the entire period. Based on the model in Brown, Goetzmann and Ross, 1995 , however, we will be able to determine how selection bias could cause the size and book-to-market e ects. If only caused by selection bias, however, size and book-to-market e ects ought to disappear by 1913. A second dataset is being collected, extending the coverage to monthly returns on 100 rms, selected randomly and without continuous-listing requirement.
In the analysis, we nd signi cant evidence of both a size and book-to-market e ect in the German data. It marginalizes the explanatory power of beta. The size e ect is of the same direction as in recent U.S. data, but disappears by 1913, suggesting that it was caused by selection bias only. The book-to-market e ect is the opposite of that of recent U.S. data rms with high book value of equity relative to market value experienced lower average returns than those with low ratios, ceteris paribus. The magnitude of the negative book-to-market e ect remains constant throughout the entire sampling period, indicating that it never picked up selection bias. As in Daniel and Titman, 1997 , the book-to-market characteristic captures far more than covariance with the portfolio long in high book-to-market rms and short in low book-to-market rms. When we construct a momentum portfolio based on the error of our 3-characteristic model, we nd no evidence signi cant returns, however.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section brie y covers the institutional context of company law and exchange regulations. Section three discusses the methodology and data used; while section four presents the results. The nal section draws out some implications of the ndings and suggests avenues for further research.
Institutional Background: Company Law and Exchange Regulations
There were over 1,000 German joint-stock companies by the early 1870s. 2 The numbers exceeded 3,000 by 1890 and stayed well over 5,000 from the late 1890's at least until World War I. Throughout the pre-World War I period, a substantial proportion of jointstock rms listed their shares on one or more of the several German stock exchanges. The exchanges also listed many industrial debt securities, particularly those of railway companies both foreign and domestic.
Most of the issuing of new securities in Germany proceeded through the universal banks. While otations could be performed by direct subscription of shares Zeich-nungsgr undung or successive founding, they were, in practice, usually done by the taking over of shares by a promoter or underwriter and subsequent sale of the shares to the public Ubernahmegr undung or simultaneous founding. Strict legal stipulations on new issues for example, the requirement that shares befully paid up before listing may have encouraged this form of new share issuing. The practice also led to the holding of temporary equity stakes by universal bank-underwriters in the rms they oated and may h a ve also increased banks' access to control rights over shares proxy voting and to seats on company boards Ausichtsr ate.
Price setting changed comparatively little between 1880 and 1913, though the 1884 and 1896 stock exchange laws formalized certain institutions that were already common practice, at least in Berlin. The exchanges employed two sets of brokers for much of the nineteenth century: private brokers and o cial brokers vereidigte Maklern. According to the 1884 law, the latter were appointed for life terms and were legally prohibited from trading on their own accounts or joining with other brokers. The o cial brokers were responsible for setting securities prices based on the uni ed price system. Under this procedure, a type of call market, brokers balanced purchase and sale orders and determined, after a round of price announcements and recalculations, the nal binding price for all orders placed that day.
Contemporary observers claimed that price setting was not exact or reliable enough and that, in setting the market price, the brokers often followed the wishes of interested bankers, especially when a deal could not beexecuted on the given day Wiener, 1905 . Indeed, such critics added to the voices calling for reform in the early 1890's. The 1896 law instituted the o cial brokers called Kursmaklern and established the uni ed price system as the national norm. To the extent that these institutions predated the 1896 law, however, little change in exchange operations would beexpected. The new regulations also stipulated that prices beo cially set by the exchange directors, in the absence of outsiders i.e., only the commissioner, secretary, brokers, directors, and representatives of other trades prescribed by exchange regulations were permitted to be present.
Previous historical research
The historical literature has traditionally paid much attention to the role of the universal banking system in the industrialization of Germany, leaving the securities markets relatively unexplored. While some research maintains that the German secondary markets remained largely underdeveloped during even the later stages of industrialization e.g., Kennedy, 1987 , Michie, 1988 , and DeLong and Becht, 1992 , little empirical evidence has been gathered to support this idea. Interrelations between the universal banking system and securities markets are poorly understood, and the question of market e ciency and the pricing of risk hardly has been raised.
The German experience raises important general issues: rst, whether the combination of securities underwriting and trading with commercial banking services naturally leads to partial internalization of securities trading within banks, and, second, how such market internalization a ects the operation of secondary markets. In investigating the in uence of nancial institution design on secondary markets, this study goes to the roots of both the universal banking system and the Berlin stock market
The modern literature on the German stock exchanges is extremely sparse; indeed, to our knowledge, nobody has undertaken a study like the one we propose. In a series of papers, Tilly 1986 , Kennedy 1991 , and Kennedy and Britton 1985 examine portfolio behavior in Germany. Their research, however, emphasizes risk-return tradeo s and ecient portfolio diversi cation. The authors, particularly Tilly, hypothesize that the joint provision of investment and commercial services characteristic of the German universal banking system ameliorated problems of asymmetric information and thereby improved risk management.
DeLong and Becht 1992 take a di erent tack by estimating excess volatility in the Berlin market over the period from 1876 to 1913 and 1951 to 1990 . They nd that perfect foresight fundamentals overpredict volatility in the pre-war period but underpredict in the more recent period. The results, they speculate, stem from the role of the universal banks in intermediating information and substituting for poorly-developed markets. In particular, they suggest that universal banks were able to convince wary investors of the desirability stable yields and market values of the rms the banks promoted and insured this outcome by actively managing share prices. Such was the argument of Prion 1910 Prion , 1929 , who claimed at least for the latter part of the period that nearly all securities on the exchanges had a Schutzpatron" literally, a patron saint, typically a bank, who consulted daily with the exchange brokers on the determination of the price. The postwar appearance of excess volatility, in this view, follows from the demise of the banks' role in the exchanges and the concurrent spread of speculators in the securities markets. In a similar vein, Wetzel 1996 assesses the impact of the 1896 stock exchange law on the e ciency of the Berlin B orse, comparing volatility ratios before and after the ban on futures trading.
Methodology and Data

Methodology
In order to facilitate easy and comprehensive comparison with results from studies of recent stock market history, w e use the Fama-MacBeth methodology when analyzing the cross-section of average returns on the Berlin B orse in the period 1881-1993.
In the rst stage of the analysis, we project annual returns onto an intercept, beta, and size and book-to-market characteristics, producing time series of estimates of four coe cients. Market betas are estimated in a time series projection of each stock's return onto the return of a proxy of the market portfolio, covering the entire sampling period.
We study the time series average values of the estimated coe cients in the annual crosssectional projections, as well as their evolution over time. For example, we investigate whether the magnitude of the coe cient of size decrease over time, as would be expected if size picks up selection bias.
In a second stage, we project annual returns onto another risk factor as well, in particular, the covariance with the return on HLM. This will help determine whether the book-to-market characteristic proxies for risk we will nd that size captures selection bias, so that no further analysis needs to be performed.
In a third stage, we study momentum e ects. We view momentum as a residual e ect. The presence of a momentum e ect will be shown to reveal whether there remains unexplained cross-sectional variation in average returns. Hence, momentum works as a diagnostic check, and we compute the average return from a speci c momentum portfolio to test whether we h a ve captured all the cross-sectional variation in mean returns. That momentum can potentially provide a diagnostic check is corroborated by Chordia and Shivakumar, 2000 , who discovered a statistical model of expected returns that completely eliminated the momentum e ect.
Some of the papers that cover the recent U.S. history e.g., Fama and French, 1996; Daniel and Titman, 1997; Davis, Fama and French, 2000 do not use the Fama-MacBeth methodology. Instead, they use a methodology Gibbons' methodology where excess returns are projected onto risk factors portfolio returns. The e ect of characteristics size, book-to-market ratios are examined by investigating returns on purposely built portfolios. Gibbons' method has the advantage that it eliminates the estimation error of betas in the rst step of the Fama-MacBeth methology. Unlike the Fama-MacBeth methodology, h o wever, it does not force betas to be constant o ver long periods of time. We opted for the Fama-MacBeth methodology because we are investigating a long time series 21 years of long-horizon annual returns. Moreover, it readily allows one to investigate the additional explanatory power of the book-to-market characteristic by simply adding it in the second step of the Fama-MacBeth procedure, instead of investigating purposely built portfolios, a procedure that has recently been shown to bias the results against a model with risk factors Berk, 2000. 
Data Sources
The current study uses a sample of 50 rms selected by Rettig 1978 and augmented by Fohlin 1998 . The time period, 1880 , is constrained on the early side by the availability of the necessary nancial data and on the later end by World War I. The sample is strati ed to represent the regional, sectoral, and size variation of Berlin-listed companies and is restricted to rms in continuous existence and listing throughout the period. This last criterion imparts an obvious selection bias to the data, and we discuss this issue at length in the following sub-section.
The analysis requires several types of data: share prices, dividends, bookcapitalization, total assets, reserves, and other nancial information. Annual share prices, along with the remainder of the necessary data capitalization, total assets, reserves, annual dividend, and other nancial data come from the annual reports of the companies, reported in both Saling's B orsen-Jahrbuch part II and the Handbuch der deutschen Aktiengesellschaften. The former covers all rms listed on the Berlin exchange beginning in 1876, while the latter reports on every German joint-stock company beginning in 1895.
The German stock markets and reporting agencies during this period reported share prices as the ratio of the market value to the par value of the share, multiplied by 100 known as the Kurs. Dividend-adjusted return is the annual percentage change in Kurs plus annual dividends as a percentage of market value. Dividend-adjusted beta is the coe cient estimate from a regression of dividend-adjusted returns on the dividendadjusted market return taken from Gielen, 1994 . For the current sample, the book value of total equity the sum of par value of total share capital and reserves is reported in aggregate, so the total numberand par value of shares is not available separately. Thus, market value of equity is calculated as the product of the Kurs and the bookvalue of equity. This method obviously overestimates the market value of all rms. The book-tomarket ratio is calculated as 100 Kurs. Financial performance is the ratio of net income to bookequity, and a dummy variable is de ned as 1 when the NI BE ratio is negative and zero otherwise. NI+ BE is equal to NI BE when positive and zero otherwise.
A Digression on Selection Bias
Our preliminary sample has a serious selection bias, because rms are chosen on the basis of continuous listing over the entire sampling period. It is important to study how this may in uence a cross-sectional study of average excess returns.
The model in BGIR provides a useful analytical framework. The model assumes that, in the absence of sampling bias, prices follow a geometric Brownian motion with an absorbing lower barrier to re ect delisting under distress. If, however, sampling is based on continuous listing, the measured process will have markedly di erent drift expected return, but the same mean-zero stochastic component as the original process. In particular, the following obtains.
At any point in the sampling period, the bias in the drift is decreasing in the level of the stock price.
Given a level of the stock price, the bias in the drift decreases over time, and disappears by the end of the sampling period. The measurement of risk covariance with the market portfolio or any other portfolio that re ects aggregate risk is not a ected.
The last observation holds only locally, i.e., if returns are measured over short intervals. If, however, delisting risk is idiosyncratic unrelated to aggregate risk, the observation will obtain over longer intervals as well.
What do these ndings imply about patterns in the cross-section of average returns of a sample that is a ected by selection bias?
Since size market capitalization is highly correlated with the stock price, selection bias will induce the very size e ect that is present in recent U.S. data: the average returns drift are decreasing in price, and, hence, size.
Likewise, to the extent that book value over market value of equity correlates negatively with price, selection bias will induce the positive book-to-market e ect that one observes in recent U.S. data: the average returns are decreasing in price, and, hence, increases in the ratio of book value over market value of equity.
If the size e ect and or book-to-market e ects are caused by selection bias, they ought to disappear by the end of the sampling period.
To the extent that covariances with the market portfolio, SLM, or HLM re ect aggregate risk that is priced, their e ect should show up irrespective of selection biases. E.g., if the covariance with the market portfolio is priced risk, then this should show up in cross-sectional projections of excess returns onto market beta." Likewise, if covariance with the SLM portfolio represents priced risk, then it should show up in the projections.
There should not be any bias in the estimation of the price of covariance risk. E.g., if covariance with the SLM portfolio is priced risk, it must not disappear over time, unlike the size e ect itself if the latter was caused by selection bias.
The only e ect of continuous-listing selection bias on the cross-sectional prejections of average returns is that it lowers the explanatory power of covariance risk lower R 2 s and it marginalizes its signi cance.
A Digression On Momentum
Over the last ten years, evidence has been growing that there is a strong momentum e ect in U.S. stock returns since the late 1920s. That is, a portfolio long in recent winners and short in recent losers generates signi cant positive returns. In fact, this momentum e ect is to be expected whenever there is any cross-sectional variation in mean returns. Indeed, the expected return on a momentum index is determined directly by the spread variance of mean returns in cross-section. To see this, assume that returns are independently and identically distributed over time. Let R n;t denote the return on asset n over period t. Let n denote the expected return, assumed constant over time: n = E R n;t . De ne the momentum portfolio for period t + 1 as follows. The weight on security n is R n;t , R E; t =N, where R E; t is the prior-period return on an equally weighted portfolio of all securities. In words, security n receives a weight proportional to how much it outperformed an equally-weighted index in the previous period. Since , R E; t = R E; t , R E; t = 0; this is a zero-investment portfolio the weights add up to zero. This also means that the weights ought t o b e interpreted as numberof dollars invested in each security. Next period's dollar payo on the momentum index, R mom t , will be
R n;t , R M;t R n;t+1 =N :
The expected payo is:
R n;t , R E; t R n;t+1 Consequently, the expected payo equals the cross-sectional variance of mean returns. If there is any di erence in mean returns across securities, the momentum index will generate a positive p a yo on average. Therefore, if momentum portfolios have historically generated large positive returns, this proves indirectly that there have been signi cant di erences in mean returns.
We can exploit this mathematical fact to use momentum as a diagnostic check of whether we have explained all the cross-sectional variation in mean returns, as follows. Let e n denote the expected return on security n predicted by our empirical asset pricing model we'll use the three-factor model, where beta, size and book-to-market explains the cross-section of mean returns. Allow for a potential pricing error n , where n = n , e n :
Assume that our empirical asset pricing model at least prices securities correctly on average: 1
The following momentum portfolio exploits the potential presence of pricing errors, because it will generate signi cant positive returns if there are indeed pricing errors. De ne the weight on security n to be R n;t , e n =N:
1 It is straightforward to show that this momentum" index is a zero-investment portfolio. Now compute its expected payo in excess of what our empirical asset pricing model would predict: The foregoing demonstrates that the performance of speci c momentum portfolios can be used as diagnostic test for an asset pricing model. That is, payo s on momentum indices can be used as the basis of speci cation tests. We will apply such a test later on. Table I provides descriptive statistics of the variables to be used in the cross-sectional analysis of average stock returns. There is enough variation in the explanatory variables market value of equity; book-to-market ratio for the cross-sectional regressions to be meaningful. One outlier, with returns of 1,303.33 percent in 1884, was omitted. Figure 1 plots the time series of dividend-adjusted returns on all 50 rms dots and the market index circles. The spread of the returns on the 50 rms around the return of the market suggests that the 50 rms are typical. There is a survivorship bias in the sample of 50 rms, however. Figure 2 highlights this bias: the average return on the 50 rms is higher than those on the index in earlier years. One could conjecture that part of the di erence in average returns may have to beattributed to the fact that the average return on the 50 rms is based on equal weighting, while the market index we use is value weighted. Equal weighting imposes a relatively higher weighting on smaller rms, which in recent U.S. history have outperformed larger rms.
Results
Contrary to this conjecture, however, Table IIdocuments that small rms quintile 1 in fact had a lower average return 7.46 p.a. than large rms quintile 2: 14.03 p.a.. The numbers in the table are remarkable, when contrasted with recent U.S. data. While small rms are more risky as measured with standard deviation, they generate smaller average returns. Moreover, unlike in recent U.S. data, there is not a monotonically negative relationship between size and beta. The beta of our largest rms is higher than that of our smallest rms. The middle quintiles generate the lowest betas. Still, like in U.S. data, the book-to-market of the smallest rms is substantially higher than that of other rms. The net income as percentage of bookvalue of equity is lower for small rms, indicating that some of them are really rms in distress, as in recent U.S. data Fama and French, 1995. Table IIalso provides descriptive statistics for groups of rms ranked by estimated beta. As in recent U.S. data, there is a slight negative relationship between mean return and beta we will determine the signi cance later. There is no relationship between beta and size, unlike in recent U.S. data. Table III paints a more complete picture of the correlations between the various return and rm characteristics. The slight negative relationship between beta and return reappears, but is insigni cant p = 0 :17. The correlation between beta and size is positive unlike in recent U.S. data and signi cant p 0:01, as is the correlation between beta and book-to-market.
As in recent U.S. data, the relationship between return and size is positive, but it is not signi cant. More striking is the signi cant, negative correlation between book-tomarket and return: unlike in recent U.S. data, rms with high levels of book value relative to market value of equity generate lower returns. Table IV translates all this in the more familiar Fama-Macbeth two-step regression results. Robust-regression and OLS-regression results are displayed, although the di er-ences are minor.
Baseline Multi-Characteristic Models
The negative, albeit insigni cant relation between return and beta is prominent. This con rms ndings in recent U.S. data. In multivariate prjections of return onto beta, size and book-to-market, the relation with beta becomes positive, but remains insigni cant. The usual size e ect appears small rms generate higher returns on average and is signi cant. The book-to-market e ect, however, is opposite that of the U.S. The size e ect is absorbed by t wo additional explanatory variables, however: i earnings to book value of equity; ii earnings when positive as a percentage ofbookvalue.
The size e ect could have been caused by survivorship bias, as explained earlier. The book-to-market e ect cannot be attributed to survivorship bias, because it is of opposite sign than expected. If the size e ect has indeed been caused by sample bias, we ought to observe a decline over time. Figure 3 plots the evolution of the coe cient in the multivariate regressions of return onto beta, size and book-to-market. The magnitude of the coe cient declines over time, con rming our conjecture that size picks up the survivorhip bias.
There is no evidence that the book-to-market e ect changes over time. Figure 4 documents that the coe cient to book-to-market remained equally strong during the entire sampling period. It is negative in all but one year.
The weakness of the relationship between beta and market return might be attributable to estimation error. We estimated betas from the time series of annual returns on each rm individually, instead of assigning betas estimated from groups of betas. Still, the coe cient to beta in the cross-sectional regression of return on beta, size and book-to-market is estimated fairly accurately. In principle, it should recover the actual return on the market index. Figure 5 demonstrates that there is indeed little di erence between the estimated coe cients to beta and the annual market return. Because the di erence is so small, we might attribute the lack of signi cance of the average coe cient to the volatility of the market index. However, over the 33-year period, the average return on the market index was 7.6. With a volatility of 8.7 p.a., this average is signi cantly positive at p 0:01. Hence, the weakness of the relation between return and beta cannot beattributed to the volatility in the market index. It is very hard to nd any evidence of a signi cant relationship, and, hence, con rm the CAPM; but there is no purely statistical reason for this failure.
Book-to-Market Beta
While the size e ect appears to be related to selection bias in our sample, the bookto-market e ect is genuine. Consequently, it deserves closer scrutiny. In particular, we should investigate whether the book-to-market ratio proxies for risk. We do this by estimating a second beta, namely, the beta relative to the Fama-French HLM portfolio, and including this beta in the second step of the Fama-MacBeth procedure. If the bookto-market e ect re ects risk, it is hoped that it can be captured by the HLM beta. In the analysis, we construct the HLM as an equally weighted portfolio, long in the top quintile of rms ranked by book-to-market, and short in rms in the bottom quintile.
The last column in Table IV lists the estimation results in the second step of the Fama-MacBeth procedure. Evidently, the HLM beta has no impact on the book-tomarket e ect. Moreover, its coe cient is insigni cant on average. This corroborates recent U.S. history Daniel and Titman, 1997 , but is contrary to earlier U.S. history Davis, Fama and French, 2000. 
Momentum Portfolio Returns
To determine whether our 3-characteristic model market beta, size and book-to-market captures the cross-sectional variation in mean returns, we implement the momentum portfolio in ?? and test whether its average return is zero. We nd that the average annual return is 7.3. With a standard error of 54, this is hardly signi cant p = 0 :23. Figure 6 plots the evolution of the return on this momentum portfolio against that of the market. While the momentum portfolio is more volatile than the market, the lack of signi cance of its average return cannot beattributed to a few outliers. Only in later years after 1900 are the returns on the momentum portfolio predominantly positive.
From this result, we conclude that our model captures most of the cross-sectional variation in mean returns.
Conclusion
We discover several commonalities but also a few di erences between recent stock market experience and annual data of returns on common stock listed on the Berlin B orse in the period 1880-1913. In particular, size and book-to-market e ects appear prominently, and beta performs weakly, in our models. At the same time, the book-to-market e ect runs the opposite of recent experience in the US, and the momentum portfolio yields an insigni cant return. In addition, the size e ect, since it disappears by the end of the sample period, is attributable to selection bias. While the presence of common e ects e.g., the book-to-market characteristic might indicate the importance of studying theoretical perhaps behavioral explanations, the di erences in the magnitude or even direction of these e ects suggests they may in fact merely be confounding in uences. Theoretical exercises may therefore prove futile in any general sense.
While any comparison across historical periods and locations must be interpreted with care, the parallels and disparities that we nd support the conclusion of recent international comparisons of the cross-sectional behavior of returns, namely, that i beta, size and book-to-market are important explanatory variables, but ii the nature of the relationship between return and these explanatory variables varies. Thus, it appears that ndings for the US in the post-World War IIperiod have limited predictive power for other markets, and perhaps even for the US itself.
Further research is needed to bolster such conclusions and to help determine the impact of outside in uences such as nancial system design or market microstructure on returns. In particular, future work should concentrate on gathering and analyzing larger samples for the German and other non-US markets in the period before World War I as well as studying the US markets themselves in the same period. By placing the German historical experience in perspective with American markets of the same time, we can better distinguish between system e ects and time-period e ects. Table I Size, Book-to-Market Ratio, and Returns: 50 Long-Lived Firms, Market equity is the price of shares times the book value of shares and reserves. B/M ratio is book value of equity divided by market value of equity. Dividend-adjusted return is the percentage increase in share price plus dividend (as percent of market value) and omits one observation of 1,303.33 percent in 1884. Marks during this time can be multiplied by three to obtain a rough estimate of 2000 dollar values. (Source: Saling's Börsen-Jahrbuch (1881 -1914 ; from Rettig (1978) and Fohlin (1994) In panel A, the sample is divided into five groups of ten firms each, ranked in increasing order of size (measured as market value of equity). In panel B, the firms are similarly ranked based on dividend-adjusted beta. One outlier firm is eliminated from the sample (size rank 1 and beta rank 5). B/M ratio is book value of equity divided by market value of equity. Dividend-adjusted return is the percentage increase in share price plus dividend (as percent of market value). Coefficients are averages over annual observations. All models include a constant (not reported). P-values of one-sided t-tests are in italics below coefficient means. Beta is estimated for each firm over the full period. ME is the market value of equity, and BE/ME is the ratio of book-to-market values of equity. E/BE is the ratio of net income to book value of equity. E/BE dummy is one when E/BE is negative and zero otherwise. E(+)/BE is equal to E/BE when that value is positive and is zero otherwise. Robust in the column heading indicates the use of a limited-influence estimator (Huber/bi-weight) in the underlying cross-sectional regressions. The estimator is described in the text. 1 8 8 9 1 8 9 1 1 8 9 3 1 8 9 5 1 8 9 7 1 8 9 9 1 9 0 1 1 9 0 3 1 9 0 5 1 9 0 7 1 9 0 9 1 9 1 1 1 9 1 3 year coefficient estimate full model beta only market index Figure 5 . Robust Coefficient Estimates of Beta. This figure presents the estimated coefficients on beta from robust regressions of dividend-adjusted returns on beta, logged market equity, and logged book-to-market ratios. 
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